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Abstract: This paper studies the evolution of Venezuelan economic institutions 
before the emergence of oil exploitation in 1920.  We argue that by 1920 Venezuela had 
developed a highly centralized state and a professionalized military.  These two 
institutions ensured that growing oil revenues would strengthen the state structure and 
protected Venezuela from the resource-conflict trap into which many oil-abundant 
countries have fallen.  We also argue that the failure to develop institutions that could 
mediate between sectoral demands and the state, the subordination of property rights to 
political imperatives and the political dominance of the commercial-financial elite 
conditioned the nation’s response to the post-1920 influx of oil revenues. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
During the fifty-five year period starting in 1920, Venezuela was the fastest-
growing economy of Latin America. Its per-capita GDP growth rate of 3.97% a year 
more than doubled the average growth rate of other Latin American countries. This 
growth was not just limited to the petroleum sector: non-oil per capita GDP growth 
between 1957 and 1977 grew by a robust 3.54%, considerably higher than the Latin 
American growth rate of 2.28%.   By 1977, Venezuela had become by far the richest 
nation in Latin America, with a per capita GDP 2.1 times as high as the regional 
average.2 
During this period, Venezuela also developed a remarkably stable political system.  
The Venezuelan nineteenth century had been marred by wars and violent conflicts.  One 
observer chronicled 39 national revolutions and 127 uprisings of different sorts between 
independence in 1830 and 1903; another one calculated 16 years of peace and 66 years 
of civil war since Independence.3  On average, Venezuela experienced one political 
transition every ten years between 1881 and 1920, making it the second most unstable 
nation in Latin America.   The twentieth century would see this change.  By the mid-
seventies, Venezuela had developed a stable two-party democracy that was hailed by 
observers as “a textbook case of step-by-step progress.” (Merkl, 1981). Venezuela 
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became one of the four Latin American nations with lowest frequency of regime changes 
after 1920.4   
Most studies of Venezuelan economic performance have centered on understanding 
what came later: a precipitous economic decline during which per-worker GDP declined 
by more than a third.5  This study, in contrast, will attempt to understand the 
institutional determinants of Venezuelan economic progress and social stability before 
t h e  1 9 7 0 s .   I n  o r d e r  t o  d o  s o ,  w e  w i l l  t a ke a close look at Venezuelan economic 
institutions before the emergence of oil.  In essence, we will argue that by the 1920s 
Venezuela had already developed a set of economic and political institutions that would 
prove to be particularly conducive to stability once combined with increasing oil rents. 
As we will show, by 1920 Venezuela had undergone a process of economic and political 
centralization that allowed the resources from oil exploitation to flow directly into the 
hands of the central government, reducing its vulnerability to the natural-resource 
conflict trap into which many oil exporting countries are prone to fall (Collier and 
Hoefler, 2002, Ross, 2004).  
The institutions that enabled Venezuela to evade the resource conflict trap also made 
its political system vulnerable to declines in oil revenues.  We shall argue that 
Venezuelan economic institutions before the advent of oil were characterized by a state 
that emphasized the distribution of political favors through the provision of private 
goods and in which property rights were subordinated to political interests.  We will also 
show that Venezuela enters the 20th century with a politically weakened landowning 
                                                 
4 Calculations use data from Marshall and Jaggers’ (2003) Polity IV data.  We refer to political transitions 
as changes in the Polity IV index 
5 Hausmann and Rodríguez (2006) offer a review of this literature.    4
class, severely reducing the capacity of its political system to develop a cogent policy 
response to the problem of Dutch Disease. 
This essay is an intellectual exercise in the theory of path-dependence, according to 
which pre-existing institutions will tend to shape the way in which an economy reacts to 
external changes (North, 1990, 2005). Our fundamental argument is that Venezuelan 
economic performance in the twentieth century cannot be understood without reference 
to the set of economic and political institutions that were in place before the beginnings 
of oil exploitation.  Path-dependence is distinct from a theory of inertia or institutional 
hysteresis (North, 2005).  As we will show, Venezuelan institutions were substantially 
transformed during the 20th century.  They were, however, transformed within the 
constraints on modes of political and economic action set by the institutions that had 
developed previous to the beginnings of oil exploitation.  
 
2.  The Economic Institutions of Venezuela Prior To Petroleum 
 
2.1 The Consolidation of Political Power 
 
During the first decades of the twentieth century, Venezuela experienced a 
profound economic and political change. A previously divided and anarchic society was 
transformed into a centralized autocracy under the rule of a powerful despot. 
Geographically dispersed military and fiscal resources gave way to a monolithic central 
control over the economic and fiscal power of the state. This control supported the 
construction of a patronage-based structure for the distribution of resources which   5
allowed the channeling of individual demands through a system of political and 
institutional loyalties. 
In this sense, the centralized Venezuela of 1920 was quite distinct from the 
Venezuela of the late nineteenth century.    National governments in the nineteenth 
century were little more than formal administrative structures that lacked control over 
great part of the territory. As in many Latin American nations, large areas were under 
the political and economic control of regional caudillos who had the capacity—often 
exercised—to launch open rebellion against the central government.6 One key ingredient 
of the caudillos’ power was their control over customs revenues—the main source of 
fiscal revenue in 19th century Venezuela.  The political history of Venezuela in the 19th 
century is in essence a succession of shifting alliances between these regional warlords 
that from time to time coalesced into temporary coalitions strong enough to change the 
central government.   
This atomization reached its zenith during the two periods of institutional 
collapse experienced in the second half of the century. The first period (1858-1870) is 
usually associated with the Venezuelan Civil War; the second (1888-1899 refers to a 
period of internecine conflict between the fall of the Guzmán Blanco (1870-1887) regime 
and the arrival of Cipriano Castro (1899-1908) to power. This atomization was reversed 
through a slow process of consolidation of economic and political power of the state that 
was initiated during the governments of Guzmán Blanco and was continued during the 
Andean Hegemony of Cipriano Castro  and Juan Vicente Gómez (1899-1935). In both 
cases, the figures that were able to introduce a degree of stability in the Venezuelan 
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political system were political outsiders—Guzmán Blanco was the first Venezuelan 
president since 1847 who did not belong to a regional faction, whereas Castro’s rise to 
power occurs as the leader of regional troops from a region that had not been previously 
been involved in national conflicts. 
 
2.1.1  Guzmán and the political centralization of fiscal revenues. 
 
Antonio Guzmán Blanco was the first Venezuelan president to considerably 
curtail and subordinate the interests of regional caudillos to those of the central 
government.  Guzmán was able to do this by constructing a complex alliance between 
business groups and loyal caudillos that worked because it was able to generate a 
marked increase in tariff revenues (which accounted for more than 90% of government 
fiscal revenues at the time).  Guzmán initially rose to power as an outsider: the son of a 
popular Venezuelan politician who had founded the Liberal Party in the early 19th 
century, he became a focal point for agreement between different antagonistic regional 
groups in the aftermath of the Venezuelan Civil War (1858-1865).  Guzmán soon 
realized that if he was to have a chance of staying in power he would need to forge an 
alliance not only with regional caudillos but also with the commercial-financial sector 
which controlled the sources of finance to the Venezuelan state. Guzmán thus quickly 
put aside the historical links between the Liberal Party and the landowning sector whose 
interests had traditionally been diametrically opposed to those of the commercial-
financial sector. 
Guzmán’s ingenious plan for coalition building started with the virtual 
privatization of customs collection.  Shortly after taking power in April 1870, Guzmán   7
created the Compañía de Crédito, a privately owned firm with minority government 
participation whose main purpose was to pay off outstanding government debts.  The 
control of the Compañía de Crédito was firmly in the hands of representatives of trading 
houses such as H. L. Boulton y Cía (which controlled 30% of the initial issue of shares)7 
or Juan Röhl y Cía (which controlled 20%)8. The revenues of the Company, in turn, 
came from its entitlement to directly receive 85% of customs revenues.9 This system 
could work well because the Venezuelan government’s main source of credit came from 
trading houses such as the Boulton and Röhl groups, which had been set up after 
Independence to fill a vacuum left by the disappearance of the Spanish Crown’s trading 
monopoly.  These trading houses were not only a source of direct credit to the central 
government but also acted as guarantors of international loans.  In 19th century 
Venezuela the financial and commercial sector were one and the same, so the problem 
of tax collection had a simple solution: to give the control of customs collection to the 
trading houses.10  The political coalition that was to emerge as a result would prove to 
have significant implications for twentieth century Venezuelan political economy. 
Guzmán’s scheme began with the customs office of La Guaira, Caracas’s main 
port, but soon extended to the custom houses of the rest of the country as well as 
taxation of unused lands, toll roads and salt mines.  At every stage, Guzmán could offer 
the caudillos a simple deal: a share in higher levels of tax collection, or a confrontation 
with the central government, loyal caudillos and the commercial-financial sector, which 
had the capacity to bring regional governments to a standstill.  The agreement would be 
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to the advantage of all parties, as long as a central issue was resolved: to ensure that the 
regional caudillos could receive a continuous stream of rents once they had given up 
control of customs houses. 
In order to address this problem, Guzmán created a set of singular institutions.  
Perhaps the most important one—which survives to this day—was the Situado 
Constitucional, a rule for the allocation of a fixed fraction of government revenues 
among regional governments.  The Situado had been created in the 1864 Constitution as 
an instrument to implement the calls for greater decentralization of the Federalists who 
had just emerged victorious from the Venezuelan Civil War.  Although Guzmán had 
been involved in the design of the Situado, its effective implementation had to wait until 
he became President in 1870.  As shown in Figure 1, the Situado significantly increased 
government transfers to regional governments from less than 2% to more than 10% of 
fiscal revenue. 
The Situado was not the only means by which Guzmán ensured that the caudillos 
would benefit from the alliance that he forged.  As soon as Guzmán reached power in 
1870, he recognized the key local caudillos as state governors and imposed a system of 
public, signed balloting which favored those who had military control of the region (see 
Quintero, 1994, p. 62).  Guzmán also started a massive public works program directed 
through the Juntas de Fomento, boards that directly administered public investment 
projects and in which local caudillos and financiers were given seats (Pino Iturrieta, 
1997).  In the end, the bargain was sufficiently advantageous to regional caudillos so as 
to buy into it. Guzmán’s administrative reforms generated a substantial increase in 
government revenues: from 13 million Bs. in fiscal 1871-72 to 41 million Bs. during his   9
last fiscal year in office, 1887-188811.  In supporting Guzmán’s call to hand over salt 
mines to the central government, eastern caudillo José Eusebio Acosta  wrote “if states 
are ensured the Situado  they will have peace, regularity and progress as a consequence 
of the interior administration that they will be able to found." 12 
The creation of the Compañía de Crédito provides a remarkable example of the 
institutional arrangement that Haber, Razo and Maurer (2003) have termed “Vertical 
Political Integration” (VPI).  VPI arrangements are an institutional solution to the basic 
political dilemma that arises from the fact t h a t  a n y  g o v e r n m e n t  s t r o n g  e n o u g h  t o  
arbitrate property rights is also strong enough to confiscate them (Weingast, 1995). In 
VPI arrangements, sectoral or geographically-specific agreements are formed between 
the government, asset holders, and third parties that receive a stream of rents in 
exchange for supporting the contract between the government and asset holders.  This is 
precisely what Guzmán attempted to do: to form a coalition between government 
creditors (asset holders), a weak central state, and third parties (the regional caudillos).    
A problem in making such an agreement enforceable comes from the fact that 
informational asymmetries between the state and asset holders will generate multiple 
incentives for opportunistic behavior by the government with respect to asset holders 
(e.g.: by claiming that tariff revenue is lower than expected).  Vertical Political 
Integration—the granting of a powerful role in government decisions to asset holders—
can help a government and asset holders institute a monitoring device that will check 
their incentives to renege on agreements.  In this case,   “it is possible for the line 
between the government and asset holders to become blurred—so blurred, in fact, that 
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as a practical matter it is difficult to distinguish precisely where the government ends 
and the asset holders begin.” (Haber et al, 2003, p. 31) 
     Guzmán was thus successful in moving control over fiscal resources into the hands of 
the central government and thereby considerably strengthening the economic power of 
the state – at the cost of blurring the line between the state and the financier elite. 
However, military power was still in the hands of the regional caudillos.  When Guzmán 
abandoned the Presidency in 1887, the complex coalition that he had engineered 
collapsed and the nation fell into a second period of prolonged internecine conflicts 
among regional caudillos similar to those of the pre-Guzmán period.  The fact that the 
central government had direct command over m o s t  go v e r n m e n t  r e v e n u e s  t o  a  g r e a t  
extent implied that the loot from capturing the state became greater, and all regional 
factions jumped into the fray, leading to a 12-year period of severe instability during 
which Venezuela had seven presidents.  After the assassination of the Liberals’ 
remaining national caudillo, governing elites decided to stave off a populist rebellion by 
handing power over to a small, closely knit military faction from the Andean region.  
This decision would have significant implications for Venezuela’s political evolution over 
the twentieth century. 
 
2.1.2  The second attempt at political consolidation: 1899-1920 
 
The period of Andean Hegemony (1899-1935) would give Venezuela the 
politically centralized state that it needed to definitively eliminate the forces of regional 
caudillismo.  Although Castro’s first cabinet was formed by the group of Liberal Party 
insiders that had placed him in power, he quickly set himself to work on the project of   11
consolidating the Andeans’ hold on power.  The key ingredient of his strategy would be 
the formation of a modern national army with a centralized command system, whose 
members had been formed in an institutional conception of the role of armed forces as 
preservers of the legal order, and whose command lines were stacked with Andean 
loyalists. The suppression of political dissent and the virtual elimination of the pluralism 
of political thoughts that had been present in 19th century Venezuela would help cement 
a centrally controlled authoritarian state.  But this was not just any authoritarian state: 
it was an authoritarian state supported by the establishment of a web of patronage-
based obligations that operated not just by suppressing dissent but by significantly 
raising the incentives to actively support the system. 
Castro started by devoting increasing financial resources to the purchase of 
foreign armaments and the modernization of the armed forces. In 1901, Castro raised 
the Army’s active force to 30 battalions (9,000 men).  He ordered the building of a 
shipyard in Puerto Cabello in 1906 and equipped the Navy with a cruiser, two gunboats, 
a brig and a transport boat.13  He decreed the creation of a National Military Academy in 
1903, putting it in charge of training officer corps within the traditional divisions of 
infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineering.  This signaled an important break with the 
previous tradition, under which officer corps had been trained within the regular troop 
ranks.14  The Military reforms would ensure the formation of a professionalized military 
that was formed in the doctrine of national defense and the preservation of the State. 
Unlike Guzmán, Castro’s relation with economic elites and foreign powers were 
extremely tense. His continuous provocation of the Caracas financiers and his refusal to 
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pay outstanding international debts—culminating in the 1902 blockade and 
bombardment of Venezuelan ports by Great Britain and Germany—pushed the elite to 
openly embrace any alternative to or substitute for Castro. The military control of the 
Andean army under Castro, however, would make it virtually impossible to realize this 
substitution militarily. It would ultimately come through the 1908 coup engineered by 
his Vice-President and principal collaborator, the Andean general Juan Vincente 
Gómez. 
In many ways, Gómez continues and deepens the process of political 
centralization initiated by Castro. Gómez inaugurated  the School of Military Application 
and created the position of Inspector General of the Army, integrating and coordinating 
the political-administrative activities of the Armed Forces.  By 1913, five years into 
Gómez’s reign, the Venezuelan Armed Forces had already tripled in size relative to 
1900.15  In contrast to Castro, Gómez showed a much greater capacity to garner the 
support of economic and political elites. Gómez’s  cabinets were integrated by some of 
Venezuelan society’s most prominent intellectuals such as José Gil Fortoul and Manuel 
Díaz Rodríguez and financiers such as Manuel Antonio Matos and Pedro R. Tinoco. 
Gómez also reestablished Venezuelan international economic relations with the key 
powers by returning all the concessions that had been revoked by Castro.  The emerging 
political system was extremely stable. Supported by domestic elites, a strong, 
consolidated internal army and the approval of international powers, Gómez would 
exercise power for 27 years until his death from natural causes in 1935. 
Gómez’s recipe for stability went beyond a loyal army and the support of 
domestic and international power groups.  One of the most characteristic elements of 
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the Gómez dictatorship is the building up of a patronage-based system for the 
satisfaction of individual demands by the political apparatus of the State.   Gómez 
became the recipient of innumerable letters, communications and reports that 
transmitted information on both his subordinates and his enemies in exhaustive detail. 
Telegrams would flow back and forth between the Presidential Office and the Chief  Civil 
Authorities authorizing the release of prisoners from the County Jail or the naming of a 
new clerk for the County Office.  In the words of Venezuelan historian Elías Pino 
Iturrieta, the new political system: 
conserves the antiquated stamp at the center of which are the interests and 
objects of the powerful Caesar. The powerful Caesar gives and takes, without 
mediating in his determinations ministers or ministries, formulas, statistics and 
newly cast offices. (1988, p. 41)  
In a careful study of the fiscal policy of the Andean Hegemony, Miriam Kornblith 
and Lucien Quintana  (1982) find that the objective of centralization permeates all of 
fiscal policy during this period: from the priority of expenditures on telegraphic 
communications, with the objective of developing a mechanism of control over 
functionaries and opponents to the regime across the nation, to the substitution of the 
Juntas de Fomento by a centralized mechanism for the allocation of contracts by the 
Executive, to the gradual but continuous weakening of the Presidencies of State. 
It is tempting to think that the consolidation of political power by Gómez is the 
result of the availability of petroleum resources. However, the majority of Venezuelan 
historians agree that the consolidation of political power and Andean hegemony is a   14
process that temporally precedes the emergence of petroleum.16 By 1920, when 
petroleum starts gaining economic relevance, the political, military and economic 
centralization of Venezuela had been achieved, supported by an interlocking system of 
political and regional loyalties and patronage-based mechanisms for the allocation of 
punishments and rewards.  This system would have radical implications for the 
allocation and distribution of oil revenues after 1920. 
 
2.2 Property rights and the collapse of the agro-export economy. 
 
Although the reforms of the Andean Hegemony set the foundations for a strong, 
centralized political system, they did little to reconstitute the security of property rights 
that had come apart during the 19th century.  Property rights in Venezuela were still as 
subordinate to the will of groups in power during the Andean Hegemony as they had 
been previously, and the exercise of public office for private gain was considered by and 
large a legitimate activity.  This reality would severely curtail the capacity of the 
Venezuelan state to effectively carry out activist economic policies.  
By all accounts, Venezuela had been one of the most dynamic and fast-growing 
Spanish colonies at the time previous to Independence, boasting a diversified 
agroexporting economy producing indigo, cotton, coffee and livestock.17  T o  a  g r e a t  
extent, this is a result of being exceptionally situated geographically to take advantage of 
expanding opportunities for trade with the Caribbean colonies of Britain and France.  
Although reliable estimates of per capita income at the beginning of the 19th century are 
                                                 
16 Urbaneja, 1993, p. 77. 
17 Ferrigni (1999) provides an extensive review of the evidence regarding Venezuelan economic growth 
both before and after the War of Independence.   15
unavailable, anecdotal evidence points to a relatively prosperous colony, with high 
material living standards and a cultural and intellectual life that was considerably 
advanced in comparison to the rest of the region. Humboldt, for example, comments 
with admiration that “The consumption of meat in this country is immense. (…) The city 
of Caracas, the population of which was, in t h e  t i m e  o f  m y  t r a v e l s ,  1 / 1 5  o f  P a r i s ,  
consumed more than half the meat annually consumed in the capital of France.”18 
Venezuelan plains lancers acquired a mythical character of invincibility during the War 
of Independence that led Spanish Field Marshall Pablo Morillo to exclaim “Give me 
100,000 plainsmen and I will take Europe in the name of the king of Spain.19 
The agricultural economy that was at the basis of this progress would enter a 
prolonged period of decline during the 19th century, by the end of which exports per 
capita would be barely half of the Latin American average.20 This economy had been 
based on plantation agriculture carried out in large tracts of territory.  Property in these 
expanses had been gradually consolidated from the beginning of the colony and firmly 
rested with a concentrated group of families that also held local political power. The 
institutionalized power of the elite landowners allowed them to safely maintain control 
of the structures of production.  
Property rights in these expanses were all but destroyed as a result of the 
prolonged series of land expropriations that began with the War of Independence. It is 
estimated that, between 1815 and 1819, the Royalist administration took control of 312 
haciendas, representing 70% of the lands surveyed in the 1810 census.21  As Patriot 
forces recovered territory, they would restore ownership of some lands to their initial 
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owners while expropriating those of royalists.  As the war dragged on, the practice of 
compensating soldiers and officers through land ownership grew in significance.22  
The end product of this process was that while wealthy families identified with 
the patriot cause were able to retain and retake large parts of territory, an important 
proportion of land was immediately distributed between the military chiefs of the 
insurrection. José Antonio Páez, who leads the separatist movement that splits off 
Venezuela from Greater Colombia in 1830, is able to consolidate holdings of land so 
large so as to give him a virtual monopoly of beef supply in Caracas.23 As Venezuela falls 
into a prolonged period of internecine wars and political instability in the mid-
nineteenth century, the practice of land expropriation and looting as methods of war 
finance become commonplace.  A traditional 19th century verse from the Plains region 
illustrates perhaps better than any statistic the consequent effects on the incentives for 
capital accumulation: “While there’s a General around/I won’t even buy a calf/ Because 
they, in order to steal/Out of nothing will wage war.”24 
The subjection of property rights to political power does not disappear under the 
Andean hegemony.  Gómez routinely exercises the power of expropriation that was 
given to him by the monopoly of violence.  Landowners would frequently be pressured 
into “selling” their haciendas to members of the governing group.25 An American official 
of the time recounts that: 
citizens that have refused to sell their haciendas to the 
President-elect or to his friends at the prices they want to 
offer, had been incarcerated as political enemies, while their 
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properties were used to camp troops and thousands of young 
billy goats would be let loose on their cacao plantations.26 
In this respect Gómez and his clan are no different than the 19th century 
caudillos. The use of political power to accumulate personal fortunes is as pervasive and 
valid in the Venezuela of 1920 as in the Venezuela of the 19th century. The confusion 
between private patrimony and the patrimony of the Republic, which Venezuelan 
political scientist Diego Bautista Urbaneja has termed “patrimonialism,”27 is more than 
a device to ensure the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the dictator. It is a system 
through which the State ensures systemic loyalty through the distribution of property 
for political support.28 
In sum, despite the fact that the Venezuela of 1920 had recouped the political 
stability that it lost in the 19th century, it never managed to recoup a solid base of 
institutionalized property rights. Property in Venezuela had been institutionalized as a 
vehicle for the enactment of the wills of the governing group.  The activity of 
appropriation of public resources had become a common means for the accumulation of 
wealth. Peace and order may have been restored, but not the security of property. 
 
2.3 Redistributive politics in 19th century Venezuela. 
 
In December of 1840, Caracas residents had the opportunity to assist to the first 
public exhibition in the nation of a railroad car.  Similar to those carried out in many 
other Latin American countries at the time, the exhibition generated considerable 
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excitement and was succeeded by a series of articles in the written press demanding 
action by the government to initiate the construction of a public rail system.29 A 
response from policymakers did not materialize until 1853, when the Monagas 
administration finally invites offers for the construction of the Caracas-La Guaira 
railroad.  What begins is a tortuous and Kafkian process through which nine different 
contracts would be signed and revoked—often by the same administrations—with the 
only tangible output being a short stretch of track measuring less than one kilometer in 
length.30  By 1867 President Falcón’s representative in New York writes him that “it was 
becoming extremely difficult to convince the capitalists and firms of this nation to invest 
in Venezuela, as already in our Republic predominates (…) an eternal and imperishable 
anarchy that wrests goods away from those to whom they belong.”31 Finally, in 1880 
Guzmán orders a concession for the construction of the track be given to a former U.S. 
Ambassador to Venezuela, granting his company the right of operation for a period of 99 
years. Curiously, the pretext that had been given by the Secretary of Foreign Relations 
for disavowing the first contract had been precisely the 99 year duration of the 
concession.32  
The delayed initiation of the construction of a rail system prevented Venezuela 
from taking advantage of the potential gains from the development of transport 
infrastructure that many other Latin American countries experienced towards the end of 
the 19th century. 33  By 1913 Venezuelan rail density was the third lowest in the region at 
1.15 km per square km of land area, at approximately one-fifth of the region’s average 
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(5.53 km/sq.km)34.  One may be tempted to interpret this as a consequence of the grave 
fiscal difficulties faced by the war-torn nation.  Further investigation reveals that the 
same Venezuelan legislators who consistently put off the appropriation of funds for 
railroad constructions did routinely engage in comparably costly initiatives with a 
different bent.  The same Congress that ignored calls for railway construction between 
1841 and 1845, oversaw the gradual elimination of the export duties that constituted one 
of the principal sources of revenues of the early Republic.  The Monagas administration, 
which repealed the first railway contract for considering it too onerous, was however 
willing to approve a direct buy-back of landowner debts of a value equivalent to one 
year’s national budget.35 
Rather, the Venezuelan 19th century shows a predominance of redistributive 
politics targeted towards providing benefits towards specific groups and away from the 
provision of the type of public goods that could have been vital for generating a 
sustained process of economic growth.  The emphasis on using private goods targeted at 
supporting groups as a mechanism of tactical redistribution is reminiscent of Dixit and 
Londregan’s (1996) argument that, absent the institutionalized limitations imposed by a 
professionalized civil service, private transfers to supporters are likely to dominate 
redistributive politics.  In this sense, the lack of development of an institutionalized 
bureaucracy, such as that developed by Chile and Costa Rica in the 19th century, may 
have exacerbated the Venezuelan’s state chronic incapacity to provide public goods.36  
This situation would change with gomecismo.  Gómez would begin to consolidate 
and integrate Venezuelan public finances through a series of administrative reforms 
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promoted by Román Cárdenas, Minister of Finance between 1913 and 1922. Cárdenas 
centralized revenue collection and expenditure allocation in the Ministry of Finance, 
eliminating separate accounts and earmarking rules that impeded rational management 
of the public finances. These reforms were used to significantly reorient public 
expenditures towards the administration’s key goals, increasing outlays on security and 
defense, significantly reallocating public works programs towards the construction of 
highways, and completely liquidating the nation’s external debt.  
Gómez’s rationalization of the public finances goes hand in hand with his 
suppression of socially redistributive discourse.  The appeal to the support of the lowest 
echelons of society was common not only in the discourse of radical 19th century rebels 
like Ezequiel Zamora but also in mainstream politicians like Antonio Leocadio Guzmán.  
The political philosophy of gomecismo is perhaps best captured by the works of its key 
ideologue and four-time Senate President Laureano Vallenilla Lanz.  He attributed 
Venezuela’s societal implosion during the 19th century to the incapacity of its political 
system to maintain redistributive pressures at bay.  As a solution, Vallenilla Lanz 
proposed the need for the concentration of power in a caudillo that would be capable of 
reestablishing certain rationality in collective decision-making.37 
The gomecista political system would rise above the pressures which caused 
instability during the majority of the 19th century, such as the depletion of public rents in 
the attempt to satisfy multiple sectoral demands and the vulnerability of the regimes to 
a discourse of social justice and redistribution.  The suppression of these pressures will 
be based in the consolidation and strengthening of a system directly managed by a 
single figure. Demands do not disappear: they are now satisfied through decisions 
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controlled by the dictator. In the absence of intermediary institutions to bring about the 
rational aggregation of demands, the prevalence of tactical redistribution as a political 
strategy was likely to reemerge after Gómez’s death. 
  
2.4  The Political Victory of the Financial Elite  
 
Nineteenth century Venezuelan political economy was marked by the political 
divisions between landowners and the commercial-financial sector, respectively 
organized around the Liberal and Conservative parties.  The 19th century starts with a 
period that Venezuelan historians often call the “Conservative Oligarchy” (1830-1848), 
under which financial and trade policies generally favored the commercial classes. The 
Liberal Party rises to power in 1848 after José Tadeo Monagas, elected with support of 
the Conservatives, appeals to it in a bid to build an alternative power base.  Its strength 
was derived from an unusual combination of landowner support and appeal to an 
egalitarian discourse designed to garner the support of the free mixed-race individuals 
who formed the incipient middle classes in Venezuela at the middle of the 19th century. 
The attempt to sustain this complex coalition would produce a large degree of instability 
in the liberal governments between 1848 and 1870. In the end, these governments 
would prove incapable of sustaining a stable environment and their failure would prove 
to substantially undermine the power of the land-owning classes. 
The virtual destruction of cattle ranching in Venezuela precisely during the 
governments of the Monagas Brothers (1847-1858) is indicative of the incapacity of 
Liberal governments to protect even their own constituents. The Monagas proved 
powerless to stop the activities of the bands of cattle thieves of the Plains region. These   22
bands concentrated their activities in the contraband sale of leather, a quicker and far 
more effective way to earn profits than the commerce of meat or the continued raising 
and reproduction of livestock, given the necessity of quickly dispatching the stolen 
goods. The efforts of the government to stop the practice were ineffective and constantly 
interrupted by political disorder.38 Ultimately, cattle ranchers were hurt more by the 
liberal government of the Monagas governments than by the previous Conservative 
governments: exports of livestock fell from 699 thousand Bolívares in 1847 to 189 
thousand Bolívares in 1859.39 
As we have argued above, Guzmán Blanco is able to reestablish a certain level of 
economic order after 1870, by engineering a political pact with the commercial-financial 
class and putting aside the historical links between the Liberal party and the landowning 
elites. The political agreement with the commercial class is maintained during the 
governments that succeed the Guzmanato. Manuel Antonio Matos, brother in law of 
Guzmán Blanco and one of the founders of the Banco de Venezuela, became a key figure 
in the political economy of Venezuela. As the State’s main creditor, the Banco de 
Venezuela acquired a considerable degree of bargaining power. When Raimundo 
Andueza Palacios assumes the presidency in 1890, the Banco de Venezuela accepts the 
refinancing of the debt of the central government with the condition that Matos assume 
the Ministry of Finance. In 1895, Matos heads a cabinet of national understanding put 
together by Joaquín Crespo in a desperate attempt to endow his regime with some 
measure of financial and political stability. This cabinet lasts six months, but in 1897 
Matos returns to the Ministry of Hacienda as a result of a financial agreement with the 
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agonizing Crespo regime. In parallel, other commercial groups led by H.L. Boulton y 
Cía. will form the Banco Caracas, with less political visibility but a comparable amount 
of economic power.40  After 1894, these groups will coordinate their actions through the 
Chamber of Commerce of Caracas, which will become a body of vital political 
importance in 20th century Venezuela.  
The comfortable relationship between the commercial-financial classes and 
political power will temporarily collapse during the administration of Cipriano Castro. 
Faced with a refusal to refinance the public debt in 1899, Castro decides to publicly 
humiliate the bankers, hauling them through the streets and throwing them in prison. 
The bankers gave in, but subsequently occupied themselves with organizing the 1902 
Revolución Libertadora, which constitutes the most serious threat to the Andean 
hegemony. Though the Libertadora would be defeated, it constituted a formidable 
example of the political power of the financial classes. Ultimately, even the Andeans 
pledged their power to these sectors: one of the first actions of Juan Vicente Gómez was 
to name Manuel Antonio Matos as Foreign Minister in 1910.41 
The understanding on the part of Gómez of the necessity to reach a political 
agreement with the financier elite significantly contributed to his stability in power. 
Gómez generated a web of links with these elites, some of who became his key advisors 
on economic matters. Vicente Lecuna, director of the Banco de Venezuela and President 
of Chamber of Commerce of Caracas, visited Gómez weekly and designed a monetary 
reform in 1918, while figures such as John Boulton, Nicomedes Zuloaga, Inocente 
Palacios and Carlos Delfino maintained continuous communication with the Chief of 
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State. By 1920, the power of the commercial-financial class had become firmly 
entrenched.  This configuration of political power will play an important role after the 
end of the 19th century. A strong exporting sector would have been able to pressure for 
decisive measures to counter-balance the change in relative prices generated by the 
influx of petroleum resources. However, by 1920, the weakened land-owning sector held 
little capacity to influence the formation of such policies. 
 
3.  Petroleum Arrives 
 
The start of petroleum exploitation in the 1920s would have profound effects on 
Venezuela’s economy and society.42 Between 1900 and 1920, per capita GDP had grown 
at a rate of barely 1.8 percent; between 1920 and 1948, it would grow at 6.8 percent.  By 
1958, per capita GDP is 4.8 times what it would have been had Venezuela had the 
average growth rate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru.43 
We have argued that there are four key characteristics of the Venezuelan political 
system into which petroleum would make its entry in the 1920s. First, political 
institutions were characterized by a strongly centralized state apparatus supported by a 
web of patronage-based obligations and loyalties.  Second, the exercise of public power 
was pervaded by a lack of clear distinction between the private and the public and a 
subordination of property rights to political imperatives.  Third, intermediary 
institutions between individuals and the public sector had failed to emerge, with 
redistributive politics temporarily occluded by the power of a repressive regime. Fourth, 
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the landowning-exporting class had effectively lost the political battle of the nineteenth 
century to the commercial-financial elite.  These four characteristics would have 
significant effects on the way in which oil revenues would affect Venezuelan society. 
  
  3.1 The substitution of the patronage-based system. 
  
The most important political transformation suffered by Venezuela in the 
twentieth century was the substitution of an authoritarian state by a democratic society 
with effective civil and political liberties and high levels of popular participation.       
Promoters of the democratic program in the early twentieth century had to contend with 
a formidable opponent: a politically centralized state, reinforced by an armed forces 
whose institutional design was particularly propitious for stability, and with abundant 
economic resources that could be directed toward sustaining power. The innovation of 
the emerging political leaders is the creation of political parties with broad memberships 
that can defeat the patronage-based structure of the state by reproducing it. 
The idea of creating this type of party is originally elaborated by Rómulo 
Betancourt, who separates himself from communism in the 1930s to form the  party that 
subsequently becomes Acción Democrática (AD). After various failed attempts to mount 
an effective opposition to the regime of López Contreras (1936-1941), Betancourt 
promotes the idea of substituting the Marxist-style vanguard party for a party with 
ample membership. This decision was intrinsically tied to that of the formation of a 
multi-class party, in a style similar to the Peruvian APRA, but distinct from the majority 
of the parties of the left in Latin America during this period. The idea of directing the 
approach toward an ample spectrum of society forced the founders of AD to put   26
particular emphasis on the growth of its membership, developing an explicit strategy 
through which each member was required to present at least one new candidate to enter 
the party within an established period of time.44 According to Lieuwen (1961), by 1945, 
“the directives of the national organization could show subordinate and disciplined 
bodies in practically every district and municipality of the Republic.”45 At this date, 
Betancourt boasted that his party counted 100 thousand members.46 
Such a party formed a formidable potential base of support for any government.  
This is the reason why it is called upon by a group of disaffected military leaders led by 
Andean Marcos Pérez Jiménez plotting a coup against Medina in 1945. AD arrives in 
government with a broad membership base that is ready for the occupation of the 
positions of power that had been left in place by the post-gomecista system and rapidly 
takes control of middle and lower-level positions in public administration.  
Unlike many other populist parties in the region, AD and COPEI became the 
dominant institutionalized actors within a stable political system. Their success came 
from being able to substitute a patronage-based web constructed and strengthened by 
the governments of the Andean hegemony by a system of loyalties and favors articulated 
through populist political discourse and practices. This was facilitated by the availability 
of high oil revenues. It wasn’t simply a consequence of revenue growth.  It was the result 
of the confluence of expanding rents, the existence of a pre-existing fiscally and 
politically centralized state, and the need to provide a viable political alternative to a 
system of patronage-based obligations and rewards. 
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  3.2 Other institutional interactions. 
 
Other characteristics of Venezuelan political and economic evolution after 1920 
can also be understood as responses to the interaction between growing oil rents and 
pre-1920 institutions.  The lack of clear distinctions between public and private 
ownership was a key element in the failure of many interventionist policies during the 
Democratic period, such as the 1960 Agrarian Reform.  AD’s ambitious project was 
thwarted from the outset by the pervasive use of land distribution to favor party 
loyalists.  From the beginnings of the program, there were accusations that members of 
the party in power had received preferential treatment in the division of lands.  Credits 
to farmers were distributed weekly to representatives of AD-controlled agricultural 
syndicates that would in turn allocate them among farmers.47 At the same time, tenancy 
was useless without access to credit and materials, which were directed by financial 
institutions of the state characterized by high levels of corruption and patronage.    The 
end result was an exacerbation of inequality in land distribution. 48  
Similarly, the lack of intermediary institutions to mediate between particular 
distributive demands and the necessity of the provision of public goods led to a 
reemergence of tactical redistribution in the post-gomecista system. In the absence of 
other institutions, political parties began to fulfill the function of intermediaries with the 
state. In a careful study of Venezuelan industrial policy over the post-war period, 
Jonathan Di John (2006) shows that the high levels of factionalization and clientelism  
of the Venezuelan political system impeded the Venezuelan state from effectively 
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carrying out the targeted interventions that were required to transition beyond the 
initial stages of import substitution.  The end result was a low level of monitoring of 
state-created rents, excessive entry of private sector firms in protected sectors, and 
massive proliferation of public sector employment. 
Another example of the predominance of redistribution over private goods 
provision is manifest in Venezuela’s low levels of internal taxation.  Venezuela’s fiscal 
system is characterized by similar levels of expenditure to the rest of the region, but 
relatively low levels of non-oil taxation.49  Clara López Obregón and Francisco 
Rodríguez (2001) have argued that Venezuelan tax laws were routinely made more 
flexible whenever the nation had a positive petroleum shocks.  In contrast, the tendency 
of the Venezuelan state to underinvest in infrastructure in comparison to the region is 
significant:  According to Calderón and Servén (2003), in the early eighties  Venezuela 
devoted just 0.49% of GDP to public investment in telecommunications, electricity and 
transport infrastructure, substantially less than the 2.48% average of the region. 
The effects of the political dominance of the commercial-financial class in the 
beginning of the 20th century can be seen in the nation’s political response to the 
exchange rate appreciation that occurs after 1920. In 1933, the U.S. decides to devalue 
the dollar in the aftermath to the Great Depression. Since Venezuela was bound to a 
gold standard, this decision produced an immediate appreciation of the Bolívar from an 
exchange rate of 6.77 Bs/$ to one of 3.56 Bs./$.  By that time, Brazil and Argentina had 
already devalued and various Latin American nations followed suit shortly after April of 
1933. Venezuela did not.  Henrique Pérez Dupuy, the founding banker of the Banco 
Venezolano de Crédito, argued that “monetary devaluations steal confidence and create 
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instability and injustice.”50 Vicente Lecuna, President of the Banco de Venezuela, also 
openly opposed the devaluation.  The López Contreras administration finally imposed a 
system of multiple exchange rates which partially compensated coffee and cocoa 
producers by entitling them to exchange export revenues at rates of 4.60 Bs./$ and 4.30 
Bs./$, an  offsetting compensation that was less than 1/3 of the resulting appreciation.  
  The effect on tradable goods production of the resulting appreciation was what one 
would expect; the share of tradables in non-oil production fell from 38.3% in 1920 to 
16.2% in 1950, while coffee and cocoa exports would virtually disappear by the 1950s.  
This appreciation and the consequent demise of the tradables sector should not be seen 
as an inalterable consequence of the revenue influx. Governments can and often do 
implement short and long-run policies to counteract real appreciations. In Venezuela, 
however, policymakers were scarcely worried by the appreciation and did little to react 
to it.  The oil boom had come to a nation in which the sector that could halt this 
appreciation—the tradable producing sectors—had lost all ability to influence policies. 
 
3.3  Alternative routes of development: Venezuela and early 20th century Mexico. 
 
  This essay has presented a path-dependency explanation of Venezuelan political 
and institutional development.  In essence, we have argued that Venezuela’s long period 
of prosperity and stability from the 1920s to the 1970s is more than a mechanical 
reaction to the influx of oil revenues: it is a result of the interaction between this influx 
and the nature of existing institutions.    Venezuelan political actors were constrained to 
act within the framework of a strongly centralized state and a web of patronage-based 
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obligations.  They developed political strategies that were adequate responses to the 
interaction between those constraints and the expanding opportunities generated by 
growing oil revenues. 
  Perhaps the best way to illustrate this point is by means of a comparison with 
another Latin American nation which experienced a parallel surge in its export sector at 
the beginning of the century.  Between 1910 and 1920, Mexico experienced rapid growth 
in oil production, bringing it to supply one quarter of the world’s oil output by 1921. In 
contrast to Venezuela, this surge in oil exports did not bring about greater political 
stability. On the contrary, the period beginning in 1910 corresponds precisely to the 
collapse of Mexican political institutions and the succession of internal wars between 
regional groups known as the Mexican Revolution. 
  A fundamental difference between Mexico in the 1910s and Venezuela in the post-
1920 period is that Mexico did not begin a process of centralization and consolidation of 
national public finances nor the modernization of the Armed Forces at the time at which 
oil revenues start to grow. By the second decade of the twentieth century, Mexican states 
enjoyed considerable fiscal autonomy, allowing them to determine mechanisms for 
revenue collection with minimal harmonization with the national regime.51 Despite 
Porfirio Díaz’s (1877-1911) attempts to consolidate fiscal power, he was never able to 
concentrate fiscal collection in the hands of the central government. Nor did Mexico 
develop a professionalized armed forces: Díaz decided to scrap the project for 
modernizing the military because of fears of the accumulation of power by the Minister 
of War and initiator of these reforms, Bernardo Reyes.52 
                                                 
51 Courchene, Díaz-Cayeros and Webb (2000), Careaga and Weingast (2003) 
52 Hammet, 1999, p. 205.   31
  At the end of the Porfiriato, there was a multiplicity of groups of regional power 
that enjoyed access to economic and military resources, allowing them to articulate a 
challenge to the dominion of central power.  The first military challenges to central 
power proved precisely to be regional in nature—Bernardo Reyes had established his 
base of power as Governor of the State of Nuevo León and Francisco Madero, who 
succeeded Díaz in 1910, was from one of the richest landowning families in the State of 
Coahuila. The geographical and social dispersion of political power generated high 
incentives for oil companies to themselves become involved in financing contending 
factions.53 
  The absence of a professionalized military, the high degree of fiscal autonomy of 
Mexican states, and the existence of multiple centers of regional power meant that an 
influx of oil revenues did not have a stabilizing effect.  If anything, its effect could have 
helped further destabilize Mexican society, by raising the rents that could be derived 
from capturing national power.  As in Venezuela, institutional development was affected 
by initial conditions.  
 
  4.  Concluding Comments 
 
  This paper has argued that the impact of oil on Venezuela’s 20th century political 
and economic evolution can only be understood within the framework of the institutions 
that Venezuela had developed by 1920. If Venezuela had been characterized by the 
geographical and political atomization of Mexico in the 1910s, it is probable that it 
would have fallen into an escalation of political conflict similar to the Mexican 
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Revolution.  If Venezuela had been endowed with a professional civil service such as that 
of Chile and Costa Rica in the 19th century, it may have made a transition toward 
democracy with a series of solid intermediate institutions capable of mediating among 
sectoral demands and attenuating the distortionary effects of redistributive politics. 
Venezuela’s accelerated 20th century growth coincided with the strengthening of 
an institutional structure that depended on the availability of economic resources. As oil 
revenues started to decline in the early eighties, the patronage-based democratic system 
proved incapable of managing the necessary scaling down of demands. The inadequacy 
of its response led to a crumbling of traditional structures and the emergence of a set of 
new political actors grouped under the banner of the Bolivarian revolution.  The study of 
the interaction between the institutional constraints that resulted from the evolution 
that we have chronicled and the intentions and actions of these new actors forms a 
logical next step in the articulation of a new analytical political and economic history of 
Venezuela. 
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